provided able research assistance.
1

ANOMALOUS STOCK RETURNS AROUND INTERNET FIRMS'
EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS
Introduction
This paper presents evidence of persistent predictable patterns to the stock returns of internet firms around their quarterly earnings announcements. We find that the shares of these firms generally run up in price in the few days preceding their quarterly disclosures. This runup extends through the opening on the day subsequent to the earnings release and is followed by a price reversal lasting for several days.
Over the period from January 1998 through August 2000 we show that purchasing shares five days before a firm's earnings announcement and selling them at the open on the day immediately after the release would have yielded an average market-adjusted return of 4.9
percent. The short sale of shares at that time, followed by short-covering four days later, would have earned 6.4 percent. This return pattern prevails in virtually all of the eleven quarters of our sample period, as well as during both up and down markets.
The price reversal which takes place within the trading day after the earnings release is quite remarkable. While the average market-adjusted return from the previous day's close to the open is a positive 1.6 percent, the average abnormal return from the open until the close that day is -3.1 percent, almost twice as large in size.
1 3 Price pressure has been suggested as an explanation for anomalous price patterns in a number of different settings. Barber and Loeffler (1993) and Liang (1999) , for example, show that stocks recommended in the Wall Street Journal's "Dartboard" column enjoy an initial two-day runup, which is reversed, for the most part, within the next several weeks. The authors conclude that the runup is at least partially the result of temporary price pressure stemming from the buying activity of naive investors. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Lamoureux and Wansley (1987) similarly find that an initial positive price response to the announcement of a firm's inclusion in the S&P 500 Index is later reversed. They conclude that the positive initial return is due to price pressure resulting from the buy orders of institutional investors. 3 our test results are consistent with this notion. First, calculating the abnormal order imbalance statistic (as implemented by Lee (1992) ) reveals an unusually large number of buyer-initiated trades relative to seller-initiated trades in the five days prior to a firm's earnings announcement, an imbalance which not only disappears, but reverses after earnings are released. Second, this abnormal order imbalance is positively correlated with the abnormal returns generated during the week before the earnings release. Third, the price reversal subsequent to the earnings announcement results in a cumulative abnormal return over our entire event window that is insignificantly different from zero. 3 While our results, taken as a whole, suggest a market inefficiency, there may be other, as of yet unexplored, explanations for these abnormal returns which are consistent with market efficiency. Given the magnitude of the documented returns, additional research aimed at understanding their origin may well be worthwhile.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe our sample selection criteria and research design, and provide descriptive statistics. This is followed in Section 3 by an examination of the abnormal returns surrounding internet firms' earnings announcements.
Potential explanations for the observed price patterns are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 compares the returns we find for our sample of internet stocks with those of a broader sample of technology shares and a sample of non-technology stocks. In Section 6 we estimate the 4 These indices are advertising, consultants & designers, content & communities, e-commerce enablers, etailers, financial services, ISP/access, internet services, performance software, search & portal, security, and speed & bandwidth. 5 The vast majority of these firms were delisted because they merged with or were acquired by other companies. 6 We do not include earnings pre-announcements in our sample. 4 historical abnormal returns an investor would have earned over our sample period by following a trading strategy based on the price patterns we document. A summary section concludes the paper.
The Data, Research Design, and Descriptive Statistics
The Data
Our initial sample consists of the complete list of the component firms of internet.com's twelve internet indices as of June 2000, as reported on its Wall Street Research Net web site. 4 In order to minimize the effect of survivorship bias, we add to this set of firms all delisted companies which had been public at some point between January 1998 and June 2000 and which we classify as part of the internet industry. 5 This augmented list is comprised of 403 firms.
For each firm-quarter whose earnings announcement falls between January 1998 and August 2000 we collect (1) the date and time of the formal announcement of that quarter's earnings 6 , (2) the daily opening and closing stock prices for each of the 25 trading days prior to and after that earnings announcement (or for as long a period as possible, if the firm was not publicly traded during that entire time period), (3) bid and ask prices at the market opening and closing on each of those days, and, if available, (4) earnings and revenue surprises, calculated 7 While earnings forecasts are available for our entire sample period, most of the available sales forecasts are for the third quarter of 1998 or later.
8 Another high-tech stock index with historical open prices is TheStreet.com Internet index. However, its prices only go back to January 5, 1999. We repeated our main tests (restricted to the 1999-2000 period) using this index, and obtained results similar to those reported below. 5 using analysts' one-quarter ahead earnings and revenue forecasts (as described in more detail below).
7 Dow Jones Interactive is the source for the date and time of the earnings announcements. Since several of our analyses involve the close-to-open and open-to-close stock returns on the trading day immediately following the earnings release, 77 announcements (3.8 percent of the sample) for which no time is given (so that we cannot precisely identify the first trading day post-announcement) and 81 announcements (4.0 percent of the sample) made during regular trading hours (so that the open-to-close return on the earnings announcement day includes both pre-and post-announcement price changes) are deleted from the sample. This reduces our sample to 393 firms spanning 1,875 firm-quarters.
The Trade and Quotation (TAQ) database is the source of daily opening and closing prices, as well as bids and asks. To calculate abnormal returns we require a high-tech stock index with both opening and closing prices from the beginning of 1998. Only the Nasdaq
Composite Index was found to satisfy these criteria and so is used in all of our analyses of abnormal returns.
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The I/B/E/S database provides the individual analysts' earnings and sales forecasts.
Using the I/B/E/S data, consensus analyst forecasts are computed by averaging the three most recent individual forecasts for the quarter. If there are fewer than three forecasts in the quarter, then all of the available one-quarter ahead forecasts are used. I/B/E/S is also the source for actual earnings per share, as the database adjusts eps to make it comparable to the number that is 9 Total actual and forecasted revenues are converted to per-share amounts by dividing them by the weighted average (basic) number of shares outstanding for the quarter. This number is taken from Compustat (or company press releases for the quarters in which Compustat data are not available). 6 forecasted by analysts. Actual revenues are obtained from Compustat or, for the most recent quarters in which Compustat data are not yet available, the company's press releases. I/B/E/S is not used to obtain actual sales since the numbers are sometimes either missing or inconsistent with the revenues reported by the firms.
9 Earnings (revenue) surprise is defined as actual earnings (revenue) less the consensus earnings (revenue) forecast.
Research Design
For each firm-quarter we calculate the daily (close-to-close) raw return on each trading We next calculate the abnormal return corresponding to each of these raw returns. Since the event window for most of our tests is very short (10 days in duration), the metric used for abnormal returns is likely to have little effect on our inferences (see Fama (1998) ). For most of the analysis we use market-adjusted returns to measure abnormal returns. The close-to-close abnormal return for an individual stock is then computed by subtracting the close-to-close return 10 On the other hand, Fama (1998) argues that the model of market equilibrium employed should determine the theoretically appropriate measure to use for cumulating returns. In our analysis, CAR's and BHAR's yield similar inferences. 7 on the Nasdaq Composite Index from the stock's raw return. The close-to-open and open-toclose abnormal returns are similarly defined. The average abnormal return on a given event day is then the equal-weighted average of the individual stocks' abnormal returns. The t-statistic for each day's average abnormal return is calculated using the corresponding cross-sectional standard error.
We also report the results of cumulating the daily abnormal returns we find. Two commonly employed cumulative return metrics are the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR), which is the sum of the average daily abnormal returns, and the average buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). The average BHAR is calculated by compounding the raw return for each security i over a specified event period, subtracting the compound return on the market index over this period, and then averaging the excess returns over all securities. While these two methods are not likely to diverge much over short windows, we choose to report the average BHAR in our tables. Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest that this is the conceptually more appropriate measure to use. They also find that it produces test statistics which are negatively biased, making it less likely that we will find significant BHAR's over our event window. 10 The t-statistic for the average BHAR over a given window is calculated based on the corresponding cross-sectional standard error. Carhart (1997) and Barber and Odean (2000) . This is not surprising, given that our sample is comprised mostly of Nasdaq stocks, which typically have higher spreads. Section 4.1 discusses the impact of the bid-ask spread on our calculated returns.
Descriptive Statistics
Abnormal returns display a similar pattern to the raw returns. Over the 50 days surrounding our sample firms' earnings announcements, the close-to-close daily abnormal return averages -0.15 percent. The average close-to-open abnormal return is a larger 0.56 percent,
while the average open-to-close abnormal return is a similarly large -0.68 percent. Table 2 , column 2, presents the average daily abnormal (market-adjusted) returns for 11 Since the BHAR's span multiple days, individual observations are cross-sectionally correlated. Therefore, the t-statistics we report for the BHAR's should be interpreted with caution. Since virtually all of the significant daily abnormal returns occur within the 5 days before 12 The cumulative average abnormal returns for these two time periods, estimated from the CAPM, are 5.0 and -8.0 percent, respectively. (This can be verified by reference to Table 3.) 13 Several years ago it would have been difficult to implement the first part of this strategy since earnings announcement dates were often not known in advance. This is not a significant issue during our sample period, as several web sites now provide listings of expected announcement dates. See, for example, Yahoo!Finance (finance.yahoo.com), Silicon Investor (www.siliconinvestor.com) and CBSMarketwatch.com (cbs.marketwatch.com).
Stock Returns Around Earnings Announcements
14 The historical returns generated from implementing this two-part strategy are reported in Section 6. 10 and after the earnings announcement, the bulk of our analysis focuses on this time period. Table   3 , panel A, reports that the average buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 through the open on day 1 (referred to as the average BHAR -6,1 below) is a significant 4.9 percent. From day 1's open through the close on day 5 the average BHAR (referred to as the average BHAR 1,5 below) is a significant -6.4 percent.
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These findings suggest a potentially profitable two-part trading strategy. The first part entails buying an internet stock a week prior to its earnings release and selling it at the open on the trading day immediately subsequent to the announcement. 13 The second part involves short selling the stock at the open that day and covering the position at the close on day 5. The historical BHAR earned over this 10-day window averages a remarkably large 11.3 percent for the individual stocks in our sample.
average BHAR -6,1 resulting from this process is 6.0 percent (somewhat greater than that previously reported) while the average BHAR 1,5 is -5.5 percent (slightly smaller in magnitude than previously found). Both of these abnormal returns are significantly different from zero.
The calendar-time clustering of earnings announcements does not appear to be responsible for the abnormal returns we observe.
Potential Explanations for the Observed Price Patterns
Possible Misestimation of Transactions Prices
Implicit in our return calculations thus far is the assumption that all buy orders can be executed at a stock's closing price while all sell orders can be filled at its opening price. In reality we would expect most end-of-day buy orders to fill at the closing ask price and beginning-of-day sell orders to execute at the opening bid price. To the extent that the recorded closing price reflects a sell order, executed at the bid, and the recorded opening price a buy order, executed at the ask, our analysis will overestimate abnormal returns. For internet stocks, in particular, it is likely that closing prices reflect sell orders and opening prices buy orders, since day traders have come to dominate the activity in these stocks. These traders typically sell out their positions at the close of the trading day and enter into new ones at the start of trading the following day.
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To adjust the BHAR calculations for the bid-ask spread, we assume that all beginningof-day sell orders are executed at the opening bid price while all end-of-day buy orders are filled at the closing ask price. As reported in the second row of Table 3 , panel A, the average abnormal return to a strategy of buying these firms' stocks at the closing ask on day -6 and selling them at the opening bid on day 1 is a significant 3.7 percent. The average abnormal return to a strategy of short-selling at the opening bid on day 1 and covering at the closing ask on day 5 is a significant 5.5 percent. Each of these returns is approximately one percentage point less than the corresponding unadjusted return. In unreported results, we also find that the adjusted close-to-open abnormal return on day 1 is 0.6 percent, while the adjusted open-to-close return is -2.1 percent. Both of these are significantly different from zero, but are again about one percentage point less than the corresponding unadjusted returns. Even after deducting the bid-ask spread, the average BHAR's remain economically large.
A Risk-Based Explanation
In this subsection we examine the extent to which the returns around internet firms' earnings announcements can be explained by the risk inherent in these stocks. We first document the frequency with which the average BHAR -6,1 (BHAR 1,5 ) is negative (positive) over the sample period. This provides a broad measure of the riskiness of the observed returns. As reported in Table 3 , panel B, the return pattern is remarkably robust over time, and is present in virtually all quarters of our sample period. This period includes 9 up-quarters (as measured by the change in the Nasdaq Composite Index) and 2 down-quarters, the third quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2000. The average BHAR -6,1 is greater than zero in all but one of the 11 sample quarters, and is significantly positive in 8 quarters. The greatest abnormal return is 11.0 percent, occurring in the fourth quarter of 1998. The average BHAR 1,5 is negative for all of the sample quarters, and is significant in all but two. The largest negative abnormal return, -9.6
16 Ball and Kothari (1991) use a similar methodology in their analysis of risk changes and abnormal returns around earnings announcements.
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( 1) percent, occurs in the first quarter of 2000. While our sample period spans only 11 quarters, the consistency of both the pre-and post-announcement returns suggests that risk cannot fully account for the observed price pattern.
Next, we assess the impact of risk by employing the Ibbotson (1975) methodology, which allows for risk changes in the estimation of abnormal returns. This analysis is motivated by prior studies which document increases in risk around the time of earnings announcements.
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression, separately for each event day: 17 Untabulated results show the same to be true for days -25 to -6 and days 6 to 25. 14 5. Columns 3 and 5 report the corresponding t-statistics, which are based on White's (1980) standard error. The " t 's are significantly positive, as well as significantly negative, on the same event days as are the market-adjusted returns (reported in column 2 of Table 2) . 17 Moreover, these two metrics never differ by more than 0.2 percentage points. The 
An Information-Based Explanation
We now consider whether the observed stock return patterns around internet firms' earnings releases can be explained by the information reflected in those announcements. Exante, it is doubtful that an information-based story could fully explain these price movements, however. To do so would require that generally favorable news leak out in advance of the earnings announcements, and that investors overreact to the leaks, necessitating a price reversal after the actual earnings are announced.
We partition the 10-day buy-and-hold abnormal return surrounding each earnings announcement into four components: (i) the buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 through the close on day -1, (ii) the close-to-open return on day 1, (iii) the open-to-close 18 See Hand (2000a) , Rajgopal, Kotha, and Venkatachalam (2000) , Demers and Lev (2001) , and Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (2000) .
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return on day 1, and (iv) the buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day 1 through the close on day 5. Each return component is then separately regressed on the earnings and revenue surprises in the earnings announcement. Earnings surprise is defined as the difference between actual earnings per share and the consensus analyst earnings forecast, scaled by the beginning price of the return window. Revenue surprise is defined as the difference between actual revenues per share and the consensus analyst revenue forecast, again scaled by the beginning price of the return window. Revenue surprise is chosen as an independent variable because of recent findings that internet firm stock prices are positively related to their reported revenue.
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There are 856 (470) firm-quarters for which earnings (revenue) forecasts are available and for which earnings (revenue) surprises can be calculated. In order to minimize the influence of outliers, we treat as missing any earnings (revenue) forecast which deviates more than 50 percent from actual earnings (revenues). Nineteen (five) percent of the earnings (revenue) forecasts exceed these bounds. Including these extreme surprises in the sample does not qualitatively change our results. Table 5 presents the regression results. In the pre-announcement period the coefficient on earnings surprise is an insignificant 0.21, while the coefficient on revenue surprise is an insignificant 0.305. Apparently, the observed pre-announcement price runup is not due to the leakage of favorable news in advance of the earnings release. For the close-to-open period on day 1 the coefficient on earnings surprise is 0.374, which is marginally insignificant, while the coefficient on revenue surprise is an insignificant 0.190. Furthermore, neither the earnings 19 At first glance the insignificance of the revenue surprise, especially on day 1, appears to be at odds with prior studies which find the prices of internet stocks to be significantly and positively related to revenues. It suggests that analysts' revenue forecasts may not adequately reflect the market's expectation of revenues, a conjecture supported by the findings of Trueman, Wong, and Zhang (2001) for portals, content/community firms, and e-tailers. 20 In addition to the previously mentioned articles discussing the day trading phenomenon, see "Day Trading: It's a Brutal World," by Daniel Kadlec (Time Magazine, August 9, 1999) and "Market on a High Wire: Momentum Players Ignore the 'Tomorrow Factor'," by Rebecca Buckman (The Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2000) . 21 As few as 10 to 15 percent of these firms' shares are sold in the initial public offerings. In addition, the shares held by insiders cannot be sold during the share lockup period, which normally lasts for at least six months. (See the discussion later in this subsection.) 16 surprise nor the revenue surprise is significantly related to the open-to-close abnormal return that day (the regression coefficients are 0.322 and 0.287, respectively). The same is true for the abnormal return over the next four days, as well, where the coefficient on earnings surprise is an insignificant -0.458 and the coefficient on revenue surprise is an insignificant 0.511. 19 The postannouncement price decline appears not to be due to either a delayed response or a market overreaction to the news contained in the earnings report.
A Price Pressure Explanation
An alternative potential explanation we now explore is that of price pressure, whereby an unjustifiably high level of investor optimism and share demand (relative to a firm's earnings prospects) boosts prices in the days before an earnings announcement, and an abating of that demand causes a subsequent price reversal. By causing prices to deviate from fundamental values, price pressure reflects a form of market inefficiency. The possibility that price pressure might be driving returns in our setting is suggested by the rather unique conditions surrounding the trading of internet stocks: a relatively large demand for shares from short-term retail investors, especially day and momentum traders, 20 and a small supply of firm shares available for trading in the marketplace.
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22 Including trades executed when the market is closed would have required us to identify, for each earnings release, those trades taking place before the after-hours announcement and those taking place afterwards. We do not expect that our results would change if these trades were included, especially given the relatively small level of afterhours trading volume.
(2)
If price pressure is at least partially responsible for these stock return patterns, then we should observe an abnormally high number of buyer-initiated relative to seller-initiated trades in the days before an earnings announcement as well as a positive association between the preannouncement price runup and the magnitude of the abnormal order imbalance. During the post-announcement period the excess of buyer-initiated trades should disappear. Finally, the pre-announcement BHAR should be completely reversed in the days after the earnings release.
In the remainder of this subsection we examine the extent to which these predictions are consistent with our data.
We employ the tick test to determine the daily number of buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated trades. A trade is considered to be buyer-initiated if either the immediately preceding trade, as recorded on the TAQ database, is at a lower price or, if at the same price, the last nonzero price change is positive. Similarly, a trade is considered to be seller-initiated if either the immediately preceding trade is at a higher price or, if at the same price, the last non-zero price change is negative. We include trades made during normal market hours (9:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. Eastern time), but exclude those made either before market opening or after market closing.
22 Following Lee (1992) the order imbalance on event day t surrounding the quarter m earnings announcement of firm i, denoted by OI itm , is defined as:
where:
NBUY itm = number of buyer-initiated trades for firm i on event day t in quarter m, NSELL itm = number of seller-initiated trades for firm i on event day t in quarter m, and NTRD im = number of trades per day, averaged over the days {-25,...,-11,11,...,25} surrounding the quarter m earnings announcement of firm i.
For each earnings announcement in our sample, the order imbalance is calculated for each of the event days from t = -5 to t = 5. The difference between the number of buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated trades each day is normalized by the average number of daily trades over days t = -25 to t = -11 and t = 11 to t = 25 associated with that earnings announcement.
The abnormal order imbalance, denoted by AOI itm , is given by:
where the 'normal' order imbalance is the average of the order imbalances over the period t = -25 to t = -11 and t = 11 to t = 25. Table 6 , panel A reports the average order imbalance for event days -5 through 5.
Consistent with a price pressure explanation for the documented returns, the average abnormal order imbalance is significantly positive for each of the four days before the earnings announcement, reflecting an abnormally high number of buyer-initiated relative to sellerinitiated trades. Furthermore, as reported in panel B of Table 6 , the pre-announcement price runup, BHAR -6,1 , is significantly positively related to this abnormal order imbalance, again suggesting that price pressure is at least partially driving returns. (The regression coefficient on the abnormal order imbalance is a significant 0.502.) Once earnings are announced, the imbalance turns significantly negative (see panel A), signifying an abnormally large number of seller-initiated relative to buyer-initiated trades. Apparently, many traders take advantage of the temporarily high stock price just after the earnings announcement to either liquidate their holdings or establish short positions. In fact, traders' actions subsequent to the earnings release cause the positive pre-announcement BHAR to be completely reversed within a few weeks (see Table 2 ), as a price pressure explanation would predict.
We further examine the extent to which price pressure might be driving our results by dividing our sample into those firm-quarters whose earnings announcements occur within the first six months after the initial public offering and those falling outside of that period. We choose six months as it is the normal share lockup period. During this period insiders (such as managers, directors, employees, and venture capitalists) are prohibited from selling their shares; as a result, the share float is a small fraction (often 20 percent or less) of the total number of shares outstanding. To the extent that price pressure is a driving force behind the stock returns observed around earnings announcements, we would expect a more pronounced price pattern during the lockup period than afterwards. There are 618 earnings announcements occurring within the lockup period and 1,257 announcements post-lockup.
As reported in column 1 of Table 7 , the average BHAR -6,1 for the lockup period is a significant 6.7 percent, while the average BHAR 1,5 is a significant -7.4 percent. Additionally, the close-to-open return on day 1 averages a significant 2.2 percent, while the average open-toclose return is a significant -3.8 percent. All of the corresponding post-lockup abnormal returns are smaller, consistent with the price pressure hypothesis, but they are still significant (see column 2 of Table 7 ). The average BHAR -6,1 for the post-lockup period is 4.1 percent, while the average BHAR 1,5 is -5.9 percent. Further, the close-to-open day 1 abnormal return averages 1.3
percent while the open-to-close abnormal return that day averages -2.8 percent. Untabulated results reveal that the differences between the returns for the lockup period and the post-lockup period are significant at the 5 percent level (with the exception of the average BHAR 1,5 return difference, which is significant at the 10 percent level).
Other Possible Explanations for the Documented Price Patterns
There is some evidence that earnings announcements, in and of themselves, are informative and elicit certain price reactions (see Chambers and Penman (1984) and Kross and Schroeder (1984) ). Under the assumption that managers release good earnings news earlier than bad, a firm would be expected to experience negative average stock returns between the end of its fiscal quarter and the time of its earnings announcement (with the lack of a disclosure being interpreted by investors as bad news.) When earnings are released, investors would be positively surprised, and the firm's stock price should increase, on average. These actions would produce a 'v'-shaped price pattern around earnings announcements. This is clearly inconsistent with the inverted 'v' pattern observed in our data.
Another possibility for explaining some of our findings requires the supposition that internet stocks' pre-announcement prices incorporate a very small chance of a large earnings surprise and corresponding post-announcement price jump, and a high likelihood of a small earnings disappointment and price decline. If this is the case, our sample could be biased in the sense of capturing none (or a disproportionately small number) of these large positive outcomes. 23 Even in the extreme case of a potential upside price move of 1,000 percent, for example, the probability of its realization would be more than one-half of a percent (assuming, for simplicity, risk neutral pricing, and an efficient market). This is not a very low probability, especially given that, with our sample size, about ten of these events should be observed (assuming independence across observations). By way of comparison, the largest postannouncement price movement in our sample is less than 400 percent.
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This could, at least theoretically, explain the negative post-announcement price change we observe (although it cannot account for the price runup in advance of the earnings release).
Practically speaking, though, the relatively large post-announcement average price drop of 6.4 percent implies that, at least from investors' viewpoint, a large upside price movement is actually not a very low probability event.
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Price Patterns Around Non-Internet Firms' Earnings Announcements
In this section we examine whether the price pattern surrounding internet firms' earnings announcements can be detected for either other technology firms or non-technology companies.
With conventional wisdom suggesting that day and momentum traders have been more actively trading internet stocks than shares of other companies in recent years, we expect that price pressure (and the resulting price patterns around earnings announcements) would be less in evidence for other technology firms, and even less prevalent for non-technology companies.
Our technology sample consists of all firms with the "technology" industry classification on the I/B/E/S detailed earnings forecast database (aside from internet firms). The nontechnology sample is comprised of those firms classified as either "consumer durables", "basic industries", or "capital goods" on I/B/E/S. Given the large number of observations in these two samples, we do not hand-collect the earnings announcement dates; rather, we rely on the dates as reported by I/B/E/S. 24 Since any inaccuracies in these dates, as well as uncertainty over the exact timing of these announcements (that is, whether they occur before or after trading hours), will tend to reduce the magnitude of the observed returns, a comparison with the abnormal returns for our internet sample must be approached with some caution. With the exception of relying on the I/B/E/S dates, the methodology used to calculate the average BHAR's around earnings announcements is the same as for our internet sample.
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There are 952 firms and 3,521 firm-quarters in the technology sample. As reported in the first column of Table 8 , the average BHAR -6,1 is a significant 3.2 percent for these companies. This compares to an average abnormal return of 4.9 percent for our internet firm sample (see the last column of Table 8 ). The average BHAR 1,5 is a significant -1.5 percent, compared to a -6.4 percent average abnormal return for the internet firms. The close-to-open abnormal return on day 1 for the technology sample averages 0.5 percent, while the open-toclose abnormal return averages -0.9 percent; both of these are significant. The corresponding average abnormal returns for the internet sample are 1.6 and -3.1 percent, respectively. While a price pattern similar to that documented for our internet firm sample exists for these non-internet technology companies, it is, as expected, much less pronounced.
The non-technology sample is comprised of 340 firms, spanning 1,075 firm-quarters.
For these firms the average BHAR -6,1 is a significant 0.7 percent (see the second column of Table   26 Given the small, but significant, pre-announcement returns documented by Ball and Kothari (1991) and Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988) for a large sample of NYSE and AMEX firms, it is not surprising that our nontechnology sample also exhibits significant pre-announcement returns. Unlike those studies, however, we find a significant post-announcement price decline as well. respectively). As we had conjectured ex-ante, the magnitude of these returns is much smaller than the corresponding returns for both the internet firms and the non-internet technology companies. Moreover, given the small sizes of both the pre-and post-announcement abnormal returns, it is likely that they will become insignificant after taking the bid-ask spread into account.
The Returns to a Trading Strategy Around Internet Firms' Earnings Announcements
The analysis in Section 3 revealed that large and significant average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in the range of 1 percent per day) could be generated by purchasing an internet firm's shares five days before its earnings announcement and selling them at the open on the day after the release. Similar returns could be earned by short-selling those shares at that time and covering the position four days later. These event-time returns, though, do not necessarily reflect how much an investor could have earned in calendar time. In this section we estimate the historical return from implementing the two parts of this trading strategy over our sample period. This analysis explicitly recognizes that on each calendar date the investor would be holding a portfolio of stocks, whose composition changes over time.
We begin by constructing two portfolios, referred to as the pre-announcement and postannouncement portfolios. As of any day's close, the equal-weighted pre-announcement portfolio is comprised of all stocks whose earnings will be announced sometime before the open five trading days hence. At each day's open, every stock whose earnings were announced while the market was closed is dropped from the portfolio. The portfolio is then rebalanced, so that there is an equal dollar amount invested in all of the remaining stocks. This procedure is followed for all the trading days within our sample period. 27 Untabulated results reveal a beta of 1.41 for the pre-announcement portfolio and 1.06 for the postannouncement portfolio. This is consistent with previous results which document an increase in beta prior to earnings announcements. The average daily market-adjusted return and Jensen's alpha are almost identical because the daily market premium is very small (less than 0.01 percent, on average). Table 9 reports the results of our analysis. For the pre-announcement portfolio the average daily raw return is 1.24 percent, while for the post-announcement portfolio it is -0.57 percent. Both returns are significantly different from zero. The average daily market-adjusted return, as well as Jensen's alpha, is 1.07 percent for the pre-announcement portfolio and -0.73 percent for the post-announcement portfolio.
27 These returns are significantly greater than zero and are of roughly the same order of magnitude as the buy-and-hold returns previously documented. As expected, implementing a strategy of purchasing internet stocks in advance of their earnings announcements and short-selling them after the earnings are reported would have generated large abnormal returns over our sample period.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents evidence of persistent and significant anomalies in the stock returns of internet firms surrounding their quarterly earnings announcements. Over the five days preceding these announcements, and extending through the market opening on the day immediately afterwards, the average buy-and-hold abnormal (market-adjusted) return is 4.9 percent. From the open that day through the close four days later the average abnormal return is an even greater -6.4 percent. This abnormal return is positive in virtually every quarter within this period, during both up and down markets. Furthermore, it remains significant even after accounting for changes in risk around earnings announcements, the clustering in time of many of our observations, and the magnitude of the bid-ask spread.
There is also little support for an information-based explanation for the returns we document. In particular, neither the earnings surprise nor the revenue surprise is significantly related to the pre-announcement price runup, thereby eliminating information leakage as a possible explanation for these returns. As well, the post-announcement price reversal is not significantly related to either the earnings or revenue news contained in the earnings report.
Additional analyses suggest that these return patterns are at least partially driven by price pressure existing in the week prior to internet firms' earnings announcements. Consistent with price pressure, there is an abnormally high number of buyer-initiated relative to seller-initiated 28 For empirical and anecdotal evidence of the futility of day trading see Barber and Odean (2000) , "Day Trading is a Sucker's Game," by Leah Nathans Spiro (Business Week, August 16, 1999), and "The Day TraderOnline Investing can be All-consuming -If You Let It," by Aaron Elstein (The Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2000) .
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trades in the five days before earnings announcements, an imbalance which not only disappears, but reverses after earnings are released. Moreover, the post-announcement price reversal results in an average buy-and-hold abnormal return over our entire event window that is insignificantly different from zero. These results, taken as a whole, suggest a market inefficiency in the pricing of internet stocks around their earnings announcements.
With day and momentum traders appearing to play a significant role in the trading activity of internet stocks, it is likely that they are responsible, at least in part, for the price pressure we document. If so, it is their (often futile) search for short-term profits that is, somewhat ironically, creating the price pattern which others can exploit. 28 To the extent that their trading activity will diminish during a prolonged market downturn, we would expect the abnormal return patterns surrounding the earnings announcements of internet firms to become less pronounced as well.
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 393 publicly traded internet firms (see Section 2 for sample selection criteria). Summary statistics are presented for 1,875 firm-quarter earnings announcements, covering the period from January 1998 to August 2000. Market value of common shareholders' equity is calculated using the closing price on the day of the earnings announcement, multiplied by the weighted average number of shares outstanding during the quarter. The opening (closing) bid-ask spread is the difference between the opening (closing) bid and ask prices, scaled by the average of the two prices. The abnormal return is a market-adjusted return, with the Nasdaq Composite used as the market index. returns and buy-and -hold abnormal returns, January 1998 -August 2000 The daily abnormal return on trading day t, t ∈ {-25,…,-1, 1,…,25}, is the close-to-close market-adjusted return, with the Nasdaq Composite used as the market index. The average abnormal return is an equal-weighted average of the abnormal returns of the individual stocks. Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. The close-to-open return on day 1 is the return from the close on day -1 to the open on day 1. The open-to-close return on day 1 is the return from the open to the close that day. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for trading day t is the cumulative return from the close on day -26 to the close on day t, less the cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index during that period. The average BHAR is the equal-weighted average of the BHAR's of the individual stocks. The BHAR through the open on day 1 is the cumulative return from the close on day -26 to the open on day 1, less the cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index during that period. t-statistics in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two -tailed). The number of daily observations varies between 1,750 and 1,874 for the abnormal returns, and between 1,729 and 1,758 for BHAR. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) on an individual stock for a given period is the cumulative return over this period, less the corresponding cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. The average BHAR is the equally-weighted average of the BHAR's of the individual stocks. BHAR -6,1 (BHAR 1,5 ) denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 through the open on day 1
(from the open on day 1 through the close on day 5). Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. Average BHAR's are provided for the entire sample period, as well as by quarter. Each individual firm-quarter observation is classified by the calendar quarter of its earnings announcement date. Also reported are average BHAR's adjusted for earnings announcements clustered in time, through the formation of equally-weighted portfolios of stocks announcing on the same calendar date. Finally, BHAR's computed based on the assumption that all buys (sells) take place at the ask (bid) price are reported. For each event day t, security i's excess return is regressed on the excess market return (see Ibbotson (1975) ), with the Nasdaq Composite used as the market. Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. The table reports the estimated abnormal return, α t (Jensen's alpha), the systematic risk estimate, β t , and the adjusted R 2 for each daily regression. Also reported are the estimates for regressions based on the day 1 close-to-open returns and the day 1 open-to-close returns. All t-statistics are based on White's (1980) The earnings (revenue) surprise regressions are based on 823 (453) firm-quarter observations. The 10-day buy-and-hold abnormal return surrounding each earnings announcement is partitioned into four components: (i) the return from the close on day -6 through the close on day -1, (ii) the close-to-open return on day 1, (iii) the open-to-close return on day 1, and (iv) the return from the close on day 1 through the close on day 5. Each return component is separately regressed on earnings and revenue surprise. Panel A reports the average daily abnormal order imbalance over days -5 to 5. Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. Daily order imbalance is the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades, scaled by the average number of daily trades over days -25 to -11 and 11 to 25. Abnormal order imbalance for a given day is the order imbalance for that day less the average order imbalance over days -25 to -11 and 11 to 25. Average abnormal order imbalance is an equally-weighted average of the individual stocks' abnormal order imbalances. t-statistics in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed). Panel B presents the results of regressing a stock's buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 to the open on day 1 (BHAR -6,1 ) on its abnormal order imbalance averaged over days -5 to -1. The buy-andhold abnormal return (BHAR) on an individual stock for the period is the cumulative return over the period, less the corresponding cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. The t-statistics are underneath the estimated coefficients. Those in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed). This table compares abnormal returns around the 618 earnings announcements made during the share lockup period with those of the 1,758 earnings announcements made post-lockup. The lockup period is assumed to be the first 180 days following the firm's initial public offering. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) on an individual stock for a given period is the cumulative return over the period, less the corresponding cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. The average BHAR is the equallyweighted average of the BHAR's of the individual stocks. BHAR -6,1 (BHAR 1,5 ) denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 through the open on day 1 (from the open on day 1 through the close on day 5). Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. t-statistics in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed).
Lockup period Post-lockup period
Average BHAR This table compares abnormal returns around the earnings announcements of technology (non-internet) firms with those of non-technology firms. The technology (non-internet) sample consists of firms with the "technology" industry classification on the I/B/E/S detailed earnings forecast database. The nontechnology sample is comprised of firms classified as either "consumer durables", "basic industries", or "capital goods" on I/B/E/S. The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) on an individual stock for a given period is the cumulative return over the period, less the corresponding cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index. The average BHAR is the equally-weighted average of the BHAR's of the individual stocks. BHAR -6,1 (BHAR 1,5 ) denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal return from the close on day -6 through the open on day 1 (from the open on day 1 through the close on day 5). Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. t-statistics in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed).
Technology (non-internet)
Non As of each day's close, the equal-weighted pre-announcement portfolio consists of every stock whose earnings will be announced sometime before the open five trading days hence. At each day's open any stock whose earnings were announced while the market was closed is dropped from the portfolio, and the portfolio is rebalanced. As of each day's open, the equal-weighted post-announcement portfolio consists of every stock whose earnings were announced sometime between the close five trading days earlier and the current day's open. At each day's close, any stock whose earnings were announced after the market closed five trading days earlier is dropped from the portfolio, and the portfolio is rebalanced. The daily equal-weighted raw return is computed by compounding the close-to-open and open-to-close portfolio returns that day. The daily market-adjusted return subtracts the raw return on the Nasdaq Composite Index from the portfolio raw return. Jensen's alpha is the estimated intercept from a time-series regression of the portfolio daily excess returns on the market daily excess returns. t-statistics in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed). The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for trading day t, t 0 {-25,…,-1, 1,…,25}, is the cumulative return from the close on day -26 to the close on day t, less the cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index during that period. The average BHAR is the equally-weighted average of the BHAR's of the individual stocks. Trading day -1 (1) is the trading day immediately preceding (following) the earnings announcement. The BHAR through the open on day 1 (denoted by '1 (open)' in the figure), is the cumulative return from the close on day -26 to the open on day 1, less the cumulative return on the Nasdaq Composite Index during that period. trading day relative to earnings announcement
